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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 





*        Honorable Stanley S. Brotman of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by 
designation.     
  
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         This matter, arising under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq., 
requires that we determine whether the parents of a student 
eligible for programs and services under the IDEA are entitled to 
have their daughter's private school placement funded by the 
local public school district prior to the conclusion of 
litigation establishing the propriety of that placement.  The 
case comes to us in an interlocutory posture; the public school 
district has asked us to review the district court's order 
denying a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.  This denial 
effectively directs that the student remain in the private school 
placement and that this placement be funded by the local public 
school district pending resolution of the merits of the 
underlying litigation.  Because we conclude that the district 
court properly declined to enter a stay, we will affirm the order 
of the district court. 
 
                                I. 
         In the academic year 1994-1995, Raelee S., a learning 
disabled student within the meaning of the IDEA, entered the 
ninth grade at Susquenita High School.  In the summer of 1994, 
the Susquenita school district had issued a Notice of Recommended 
Assignment ("NORA") to Raelee's parents and proposed an  
individualized education program ("IEP").  As of the start of the 
school year, the parents had not accepted either document.  
Shortly after school began, however, the parents rejected the 
NORA and the proposed IEP, withdrew Raelee from Susquenita, and 
placed her in a private school for the learning disabled.  They 
then invoked their right to a due process hearing pursuant to 
section 1415(b)(2) of the IDEA in order to determine whether 
Raelee had been properly placed and whether, accordingly, they 
were entitled to tuition reimbursement. 
         In a decision announced in April 1995, the hearing 
officer found that the IEP which Susquenita had proposed for 
Raelee was appropriate and that the school district should not be 
forced to bear the financial burden of the parents' unilateral 
decision to place Raelee in a private school.  The parents 
appealed this decision to a three member state special education 
appeals panel.  On June 1, 1995, the panel reversed the hearing 
officer's decision, finding that the proposed IEP was deficient 
in a number of respects and that "Raelee's educational program 
was not reasonably calculated to provide for meaningful education 
benefit."  (Special Education Opinion No. 672, Typescript at 13.)  
Addressing the private school placement, the panel wrote: 
         Although the private school is dedicated to 
         the education of students with learning 
         disabilities and therefore represents a more 
         restrictive placement, we find that Raelee's 
         current needs in learning outweigh her need 
         for integration with nondisabled peers.  Thus 
         we find the program offered by the private 
         school appropriate for Raelee. 
 
Id.  The panel then moved to the crux of the issue which we now 
confront, writing: 
         Parents have a right to withdraw their 
         children from public school unilaterally 
         . . . and receive reimbursement for private 
         school tuition when a district has failed to 
         provide an appropriate education and when the 
         private school meets the substantive 
         requirements of IDEA . . . .  Thus we find 
         that the parents claim for reimbursement of 
         tuition and transportation [for the academic 
         year 1994-1995] are legally permissible. 
 
Id. at 6.  Also critical to this controversy is the panel's 
statement, in dicta, that "unless this order is overturned in a 
Commonwealth or federal district court, the private school 
placement shall be the pendent placement in any future disputes 
between the parent and the District."  Id. 
         On July 3, 1995, Susquenita filed a Complaint in the 
Nature of an Appeal from the decision of the special education 
appeals panel.  Jurisdiction was appropriate under the provisions 
of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) which provides that "any p[arty] 
aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by a State 
educational agency] . . . shall have the right to bring a civil 
action . . . in a district court . . . ." 
         In the complaint, Susquenita alleged that the education 
appeals panel improperly disregarded the credibility 
determinations made by the hearing officer, made findings of fact 
not supported by the record, and, most importantly for purposes 
of this appeal, in identifying the private school as Raelee's 
pendent placement and in awarding tuition reimbursement.  In a 
contemporaneous motion for stay pending appeal filed pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d) and (f), Susquenita asked that the 
district court stay the appeals panel decision "insofar as it 
directs Susquenita to reimburse the parents for expenses and 
. . . states that Raelee's placement within the meaning of 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) is a private school." 
         The district court denied Susquenita's motion, noting 
that "Rule 62(d) requires an analysis similar to that employed in 
evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction."  (Typescript 
at 5.)  The court identified four factors to be considered, 
including:  1) the movant's likelihood of success on the merits; 
2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the request 
is denied; 3) whether third parties will be harmed by the stay; 
and 4) whether granting the stay will serve the public interest. 
         The district court evaluated each of these factors, 
concluding first that the likelihood of Susquenita's success on 
the merits was very difficult to predict.  The court found, 
however, that, "on the current state of the record made at the 
administrative level, we would conclude that the likelihood of 
success favors Raelee S."  (Typescript at 4.)  The court also 
found the public interest factor difficult to evaluate, stating 
that while the public interest favored Raelee's receiving a free 
and appropriate education, the state of the record made it 
difficult to assess whether Raelee received such an education in 
the Susquenita School District.  The court concluded, however, 
that "were we compelled to make such an assessment at this 
juncture, we would be constrained to come down on the side of 
[Raelee S.]."  Id.  The court next found that third parties would 
not be harmed if the stay were denied:   
         The only harm which we can conceive of is the 
         financial burden which will be borne by the 
         district during the pendency of this appeal.  
         We have nothing before us to suggest that 
         other students will be denied a proper or 
         adequate education if the order compelling 
         the district to fund her private school 
         remains in effect during the pendency of this 
         appeal. 
 
Id. 
         Evaluating Susquenita's allegation of irreparable harm, 
the district court found that, under current caselaw, the 
district would not be entitled to recover funds expended to 
maintain Raelee in private school even if it were to prevail on 
appeal.  The court thus found merit in Susquenita's argument that 
it would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were denied.  The 
court, however, did not find this prospect of harm sufficient to 
justify granting the stay.  "Taken together, we find that the 
relevant considerations do not justify granting the stay 
requested by the district."  (Typescript at 4.)   
         Accordingly, the district court denied Susquenita's 
motion for a stay and held that Raelee's "`current educational 
placement' for section 1415(e)(3) purposes will remain the 
private school . . . during the pendency of this appeal and until 
further order of the court declaring otherwise."  (Typescript at 
5).  This holding also effectively decided the reimbursement 
question in favor of Raelee's parents.  This appeal followed.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; we review the 
district court's order under an abuse of discretion standard.  
Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 
                               II. 
         The broadest issues in this litigation are those 
relating to the adequacy of the IEP proposed by Susquenita; these 
are the merits issues yet to be addressed by the district court.  
The issues underlying the district court's denial of the stay are 
narrow, involving practical questions of where Raelee should 
attend school while the review process proceeds, who must pay for 
Raelee's placement, and when that payment must be made.  
Susquenita argues that it has no financial obligation to Raelee's 
parents because the private school is not the appropriate pendent 
placement.  Alternatively, Susquenita contends that any financial 
obligation which it may have can be assessed only at the end of 
the appellate process.  These issues of pendent placement and 
financial responsibility are linked; in order to evaluate the 
payment questions, we must first assess the legal impact of the 
education appeals panel directive that the private school be 
deemed Raelee's pendent placement during the review process.   
 
                               III. 
         The pendent placement concept is an important feature 
of the IDEA.  In 1975 Congress enacted legislation appropriating 
funds to help states defray the cost of educating children with 
disabilities.  The IDEA, known originally as the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, was passed in order "to assure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them . . . a free appropriate 
public education which emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs."  20 U.S.C. § 
14000(c).  The IDEA resulted, in part, from a congressional 
determination that: 
         handicapped children were not being properly 
         educated and were, in most instances, 
         excluded from the classroom.  Congress 
         concluded that the problem was the result not 
         only of financial constraints at state and 
         local levels but was also due to state and 
         local laws which enabled school districts to 
         exclude children without consultation with 
         their parents. 
 
Thomas v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 918 F.2d 618, 619 (6th 
Cir. 1990).  See also H.R. Rep. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.  
         To be eligible for federal funding, states and local 
agencies are required by the IDEA to comply with federal 
guidelines and regulations established to ensure the availability 
of a "free appropriate public education" for all of their 
disabled children.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).  State and local 
compliance with the IDEA is monitored by federal review, see 34 
C.F.R. §§ 104.61, 100.7, and by procedural safeguards extended to 
handicapped children and their parents.  These safeguards are 
meant to "guarantee parents both an opportunity for meaningful 
input into all decisions affecting their child's education and 
the right to seek review of any decisions they think 
inappropriate".  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988).  
"Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance 
of parental participation in both the development of the IEP and 
any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness.  See §§ 1400(c), 
1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1) (A), (C), (D), (E), and 
1415(b)(2)."  Id. 
         Several of the Act's procedural safeguards are relevant 
to this case.  First, the Act requires that a school district 
give a child's parents written notice of any proposed changes in 
the child's established educational program.  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(b)(1)(C).  If the parents object to proposed changes, they 
are authorized to seek an impartial administrative hearing on the 
matter, id. at § 1415(b)(2), and to appeal any adverse decision 
to state or federal court.  Id. at § 1415(e)(2).  Finally, the 
Act requires that during the course of administrative and 
judicial proceedings, "the child shall remain in the then current 
educational placement."  Id. at 1415(e)(3).  This requirement has 
come to be known as the IDEA's "pendent placement" or "stay put" 
provision. 
         The pendent placement provision impacts to some degree 
virtually every case involving an administrative challenge under 
the IDEA.  A child's placement during the course of 
administrative and judicial proceedings typically has great 
significance for all concerned.  "Where as in the present case 
review of a contested IEP takes years to run its course -- years 
critical to the child's development -- important practical 
questions arise concerning interim placement of the child and 
financial responsibility for that placement."  School Comm. of 
the Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 361 
(1985).       The pendent placement provision was included in the 
IDEA to protect handicapped children and their parents during the 
review process.  The Supreme Court referred to this protective 
purpose when it wrote: 
         We think it clear . . . that Congress very 
         much meant to strip schools of the unilateral 
         authority they had traditionally employed to 
         exclude disabled students . . . from school. 
 
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. at 323.  A similar view of the provision 
was articulated in Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373: 
         We think at least one purpose of § 1415(e)(3) 
         was to prevent school officials from removing 
         a child from the regular public school 
         classroom over the parents' objection pending 
         completion of the review proceedings . . . . 
         [T]he impetus for the Act came from two 
         federal-court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. 
         for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. 
         Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 
         279 (1972), and Mills v. Board of Education 
         of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 
         (D.C. 1972), which arose from the efforts of 
         parents of handicapped children to prevent 
         the exclusion or expulsion of their children 
         from the public schools.  Congress was 
         concerned about the apparently widespread 
         practice of relegating handicapped children 
         to private institutions or warehousing them 
         in special classes.  We also note that § 
         1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing 
         procedural safeguards which are largely for 
         the benefit of the parent and the child. 
 
(citations omitted).  We, too, have recognized the policy 
concerns underlying the pendent placement provision: 
         The provision represents Congress' policy 
         choice that all handicapped children, 
         regardless of whether their case is 
         meritorious or not, are to remain in their 
         current educational placement until the 
         dispute with regard to their placement is 
         ultimately resolved. 
 
Drinker v. Colonial School District, 78 F.3d 859, 864-65 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citing Woods v. New Jersey Dep't of Educ., No. 93-5123, 20 
Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) 439, 440 (3d 
Cir. Sept. 17, 1993)). 
         Given the protective purpose underlying the pendent 
placement provision, it is often invoked by a child's parents in 
order to maintain a placement where the parents disagree with a 
change proposed by the school district; the provision is used to 
block school districts from effecting unilateral change in a 
child's educational program.  In cases of this type we have 
directed that "the dispositive factor in deciding a child's 
`current educational placement' should be the Individualized 
Education Program . . . actually functioning when the `stay put' 
is invoked."  Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (quoting Woods, 20 Indiv. 
Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP Publications) at 440).  According 
to Susquenita, the last functioning IEP was in the public school 
system and, therefore, the public school placement must remain 
Raelee's pendent placement for the duration of this litigation. 
         This case, however, differs from many in which a 
child's pendent placement is at issue.   
         Here, it is the parents who advocate change.  Mr. and 
Mrs. S. have no interest in having their daughter remain in the 
public school system under the terms of either the former or the 
proposed IEP.  Because Raelee's parents concluded that the 
program proposed for their daughter was inadequate and contrary 
to her best interest, they chose not to invoke the protection of 
the stay-put provision, opting instead to place Raelee in a 
private school at their own expense.  Prior to the time that the 
education appeals panel announced its decision, then, the pendent 
placement provision was inoperative.   
         At the time of her transfer to the private school, 
Raelee's parents did not dispute that the public school would 
have been the appropriate pendent placement within the meaning of 
the IDEA.  The parents argue, however, that the pendent placement 
and, therefore, the financial responsibility landscape was 
altered when the state education appeals panel ruled in their 
favor on June 1, 1995.  We agree.   
         In its decision the appeals panel found that the IEP 
which Susquenita proposed for Raelee was inadequate and that the 
private school placement was appropriate.  The panel directed 
that the private school be deemed Raelee's pendent placement in 
any future disputes "unless the [panel] order is overturned in a 
Commonwealth or federal district court."  (Typescript at 14 
n.27).  Relying on this panel directive, the parents argue that a 
new pendent placement was created and that, from the time of the 
panel decision forward, Susquenita is required to bear the 
financial burden of maintaining Raelee at the private school.  
The parents' position is derived directly from the language of 
the statute.  As we have noted, section 1415(e)(3) of the Act 
reads as follows:  "During the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section, unless the state or local 
educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, 
the child shall remain in the then current educational placement. 
. . ." 
         The decision of the Supreme Court in Burlingtonestablished that a 
ruling by the education appeals panel in favor 
of the parents' position constitutes agreement for purposes of 
section 1415(e)(3).  In Burlington, the Supreme Court noted that 
while parents who unilaterally remove their child from a prior 
placement 
         contravene[] the conditional command of § 
         1415(e)(3) that "the child remain in the then 
         current educational placement,' . . . we note 
         that the section calls for agreement by 
         either the state or the local educational 
         agency.  The [appellate panel]'s decision in 
         favor of the [parents] and the [private 
         school] placements would seem to constitute 
         agreement by the state to the change of 
         placement. 
 
471 U.S. at 372. 
         Susquenita argues that a pendent placement appropriate 
at the outset of administrative proceedings is fixed for the 
duration of the proceedings and cannot be altered by an 
administrative ruling in the parents' favor.  Accepting this 
position would contravene the language of the statute and the 
holding in Burlington.  Furthermore, it would mean that the panel 
decision in favor of the parents is of no practical significance 
unless and until it is affirmed by a decision that cannot be or 
is not appealed.   
         As we have explained, section 1415(e)(3) was drafted to 
guard the interests of parents and their children.  We cannot 
agree that this same section should be used here as a weapon by 
the Susquenita School District to force parents to maintain a 
child in a public school placement which the state appeals panel 
has held inappropriate.  It is undisputed that once there is 
state agreement with respect to pendent placement, a fortiori, 
financial responsibility on the part of the local school district 
follows.  Thus, from the point of the panel decision forward -- 
academic years 1995-1996 and following -- Raelee's pendent 
placement, by agreement of the state, is the private school and 
Susquenita is obligated to pay for that placement. 
 
                               IV. 
         Resolution of the pendent placement question does not 
end our discussion.  Susquenita contends that even if the appeals 
panel decision is construed as an agreement to a "new" pendent 
placement giving rise to financial responsibility on the part of 
the school district, this responsibility is not immediate.  
According to Susquenita, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Burlington mandates that prospective tuition reimbursement or 
reimbursement "pendente lite" be barred under the IDEA; without 
exception, Susquenita argues, parents initiating an 
administrative challenge under the IDEA must bear the financial 
burden of alternative placement until such time as the propriety 
of that placement is conclusively established.  We decline to 
adopt this restrictive reading of the Court's holding in 
Burlington; we conclude that a school district may be required to 
pay for tuition and expenses associated with a pendent placement 
prior to the conclusion of litigation. 
         Although Burlington arose in a procedural context which 
made discussion of retroactive reimbursement appropriate, we 
believe that the concerns underlying that decision apply with 
equal force to tuition payments coming due during the pendency of 
litigation.  Thus, while the holding in Burlington is not 
controlling in this case, the analysis employed and concerns 
expressed by the Supreme Court are useful in resolving the issue 
now before us.  In Burlington, the Supreme Court addressed two 
narrow questions:  "Whether the potential relief available under 
§ 1415(e)(3) includes reimbursement to parents for private school 
tuition and related expenses, and whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such 
reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and place the 
child in a private school without the consent of local school 
authorities."  Burlington, 471 U.S. at 367. 
         The Court first reviewed the purposes underlying the 
IDEA and concluded that the grant of authority to the reviewing 
court set forth in section 1415(e)(2) is sufficiently broad to 
include the power to order school authorities to reimburse 
parents for private school expenditures where the court 
ultimately determines that private, rather than public, education 
under a proposed IEP is appropriate.  The Court reasoned as 
follows: 
         A final judicial decision on the merits of an 
         IEP will in most instances come a year or 
         more after the school term covered by the IEP 
         has passed.  In the meantime, the parents who 
         disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with 
         a choice:  go along with the IEP to the 
         detriment of their child if it turns out to 
         be inappropriate or to pay for what they 
         consider to be the appropriate placement.  If 
         they choose the latter course . . . it would 
         be an empty victory to have a court tell them 
         several years later that they were right but 
         that these expenditures could not in a proper 
         case be reimbursed. . . .  If that were the 
         case, the child's right to a free appropriate 
         public education, the parents' right to 
         participate fully in developing a proper IEP 
         and all of the procedural safeguards would be 
         less than complete. 
 
471 U.S. at 370. 
         Having established that reimbursement may be ordered 
where a private school placement is found to be appropriate, the 
Court then held that parents who initially decline the pendent 
placement protection of section 1415(e)(3) do not automatically 
forfeit their right to reimbursement.  The Court explained that 
section 1415(e)(3) does not speak to financial responsibility or 
to a parent's right to reimbursement at the close of judicial 
proceedings: 
         If the provision is interpreted to cut off 
         parental rights to reimbursement, the 
         principal purpose of the Act will in many 
         cases be defeated in the same way as if 
         reimbursement were never available . . . .  
         [Parents would be] forced to leave the child 
         in what may turn out to be an inappropriate 
         educational placement or to obtain the 
         appropriate placement only by sacrificing any 
         claim for reimbursement. 
 
Id. at 372. 
         While we recognize that Burlington dealt with 
retroactive relief, we do not believe that the Supreme Court's 
analysis should be confined to those cases arising in a 
procedural context identical to that presented in Burlington.  We 
conclude that the policies underlying the IDEA and its 
administrative process favor imposing financial responsibility 
upon the local school district as soon as there has been an 
administrative panel or judicial decision establishing the 
pendent placement.   
         Nothing in the Act or in its legislative history 
convinces us that Congress intended to shield school districts 
from financial responsibility prior to the close of litigation.  
The IDEA was enacted to guarantee handicapped children a free and 
appropriate education and its legislative history is devoid of 
any indication that Congress intended to limit the timing of a 
school district's financial obligations in accordance with some 
pre-determined formula.  Resolution of financial disputes is not 
governed by rigid rules but is, instead, committed to the 
administrative process. 
         If a parent contends that he or she has been 
         forced, at that parent's own expense, to seek 
         private schooling for the child because an 
         appropriate program does not exist within the 
         local educational agency and the . . . agency 
         disagrees, that disagreement and the question 
         of who remains financially responsible is a 
         matter to which the due process procedures 
         . . . app[ly]. 
 
S. Rep. No. 94-168 p. 32 (1975), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
1975 pp. 1425, 1456. 
         In fashioning remedies under the IDEA, the courts are 
directed to "grant such relief as [they] deem[] appropriate."  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).  The Supreme Court in Burlington fleshed out 
the contours of "appropriate relief" when it wrote: 
         The ordinary meaning of these words confers 
         broad discretion on the court. The type of 
         relief is not further specified except that 
         it must be "appropriate."  Absent other 
         reference, the only possible interpretation 
         is that the relief is to be "appropriate" in 
         light of the purposes of the Act.  As already 
         noted, this is principally to provide 
         handicapped children with "a free appropriate 
         public education which emphasizes special 
         education and related services designed to 
         meet their unique needs."  The Act 
         contemplates that such education will be 
         provided where possible in regular public 
         schools . . . but the Act also provides for 
         placement in private schools at public 
         expense where this is not possible.  In a 
         case where a court determines that a private 
         placement desired by the parents was proper 
         under the Act and that an IEP calling for 
         placement in a public school was 
         inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil 
         that "appropriate" relief would include a 
         prospective injunction directing the school 
         officials to develop and implement at public 
         expense an IEP placing the child in a private 
         school. . . .  If the administrative and 
         judicial review under the Act could be 
         completed in a matter of weeks, rather than 
         years, it would be difficult to imagine a 
         case in which prospective injunctive relief 
         would not be sufficient. 
 
471 U.S. 369-70. 
         Delay, however, is inevitable and this delay carries 
with it financial consequences.  Concluding that "appropriate 
relief" under the IDEA includes retroactive tuition 
reimbursement, the Court explained that where parents elect to 
pay for what they believe is an appropriate placement, 
         it would be an empty victory to have a court 
         tell them several years later that they were 
         right but that these expenditures could not 
         . . . be reimbursed . . . .  If that were the 
         case, the child's right to a free appropriate 
         public education, the parents' right to 
         participate fully in developing a proper IEP, 
         and all of the procedural safeguards would be 
         less than complete.  Because Congress 
         undoubtedly did not intend this result, we 
         are confident that by empowering the court to 
         grant "appropriate" relief Congress meant to 
         include retroactive reimbursement to parents 
         as an available remedy in a proper case. 
 
Id.  We are convinced that the concerns cited by the Court in 
support of retroactive reimbursement favor including the interim 
assessment of financial responsibility in the range of relief 
available under the IDEA. 
         In this case, as in many other cases, while parents 
wait for the merits of their case to be addressed through the 
process of administrative and judicial review, they who disagree 
with an IEP proposal for their child must make a choice.  They 
may have the child remain in what they believe to be an 
inappropriate placement or they may elect to pay for what they 
deem appropriate.  This choice is real only for parents who have 
the financial wherewithal to pay for alternative placement.  
While parents who reject a proposed IEP bear the initial expenses 
of a unilateral placement, the school district's financial 
responsibility should begin when there is an administrative or 
judicial decision vindicating the parents' position.  The 
purpose of the Act, which is to ensure that every child receive a 
"free and appropriate education" is not advanced by requiring 
parents, who have succeeded in obtaining a ruling that a proposed 
IEP is inadequate, to front the funds for continued private 
education. 
         The burden that such an approach would place on many 
families is overwhelming.  The cost of private education, 
especially in institutions specializing in teaching the learning 
disabled, is substantial.  Families without means would be hard 
pressed to pay for private education in what will almost 
invariably be the significant time lapse between a ruling in 
their favor and the ultimate close of litigation.  "The review 
process is ponderous."  Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.  Without 
interim financial support, a parent's "choice" to have his child 
remain in what the state has determined to be an appropriate 
private school placement amounts to no choice at all.  The 
prospect of reimbursement at the end of the litigation turnpike 
is of little consolation to a parent who cannot pay the toll at 
the outset. 
         In concluding that the school district cannot avoid 
interim responsibility for funding what the state has agreed is 
an appropriate pendent placement, we are mindful of the financial 
burden which will, in some instances, be borne by local school 
districts.  At the risk of seeming cavalier, however, we adopt 
the Supreme Court's statement in Florence County School District 
Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993): 
         There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a 
         significant financial burden on the States 
         and school districts that participate in 
         IDEA.  Yet public educational authorities who 
         want to avoid reimbursing parents for the 
         private education of a disabled child can do 
         one of two things:  give the child a free 
         appropriate public education in a public 
         setting, or place the child in an appropriate 
         private setting of the State's choice.  This 
         is IDEA's mandate, and school officials who 
         conform to it need not worry about 




                                V. 
         Our holding in this matter has three components.  
First, the private school placement, by virtue of the education 
appeals panel decision, is the appropriate pendent placement for 
purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).  Second, the Susquenita 
School District is required to fund that placement.  Finally, the 
district's financial obligations with respect to the pendent 
placement are immediate and may not be deferred until the close 
of litigation.  These requirements are distilled from the 
unambiguous language of the IDEA, the Act's legislative history, 
and the caselaw interpreting the Act.  Given the clarity of the 
law with respect to the issues before us, we have no difficulty 
concluding that the district court's denial of Susquenita's 
motion for stay was consistent with the sound exercise of 
judicial discretion.  We will, therefore, affirm the order of the 
district court. 
 
